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I. JNRODUCTION
The Internet has heightened interest in alternative dispute resolution
(ADR). Three characteristics of the Internet make traditional dispute
resolution through administrative agency and judicial procedures
unsatisfactory for many controversies that arise in Internet-based commerce
and political interaction. The Internet's low economic barriers to entry invite
participation in commerce and politics by small entities and individuals who
cannot afford direct participation in many traditional markets and political
arenas. These low barriers to entry, and greater participation by individuals
and small entities, also mean a greater incidence of small transactions. When
dispute resolution costs are high, as they are for traditional administrative
and judicial procedures, the transaction costs of dispute resolution threaten
to swamp the value of the underlying transaction, 1 meaning on the one hand
that victims are less likely to seek vindication of their rights and, on the other
hand, that actors and alleged wrongdoers may face litigation costs that
outweigh the advantages of their offering goods and services in the new
electronic markets. To realize the potential of participation by small entities
and individuals and of small transactions, it is necessary to reduce the costs
of dispute resolution.
Second, the geographic openness of electronic commerce makes
stranger-to-stranger transactions more likely. The absence of informal means
of developing trust, as when one shops regularly at the local bookstore,
means that both merchants and consumers will be inhibited in engaging in
commerce unless they have some recourse if the deal goes sour.
Third, the Internet is inherently global. Offering to sell goods on a web
page published on a server physically located in Kansas is as visible to
consumers in Kosovo as in Kansas. In other words, it is difficult to localize
injury-producing conduct or the injury itself in Internet-based markets or
* Dean and Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. Member of the bar: Virginia, Pennsylvania, District of Columbia, Maryland,
Illinois, and the United States Supreme Court.
I A rational person will not engage in a $5,000 or $10,000 lawsuit over a $200
transaction.
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political arenas. Traditional dispute resolution machinery depends upon
localization to determine jurisdiction.2 Impediments to localization create
uncertainty and controversy over assertions of jurisdiction. That uncertainty
has two results. It may frustrate communities that resent being unable to
reach through their legal machinery to protect local victims against conduct
occurring in a far-off country. It also subjects anyone using the Internet to
jurisdiction by any of nearly 200 countries in the world and, in many cases,
to their subordinate political units.
Alternative dispute resolution, including not only arbitration and
mediation but also a wider range of alternatives such as credit card
chargebacks, escrow arrangements, complaint bulletin boards, and complaint
aggregation services culminating in official enforcement activity, helps
respond to these challenges in two ways. First, ADR can be designed to be
much cheaper than traditional procedures. It also is inherently transnational
when those agreeing to participate in the ADR process are in different
countries.
Appropriately designed ADR mechanisms offer lower costs, reassure
participants, and solve the jurisdictional problem because use of them
manifests consent. As important, many forms of ADR involve a readily
available fund (usually the payment for the disputed transaction) as a way of
satisfying a decision for either disputant. The availability of a fund often is
underestimated as a consideration. This consideration may explain why
intermediary-provided dispute resolution, such as credit card chargebacks
and escrow arrangements, prove more attractive in practice than independent
third-party mechanisms such as arbitration or mediation. The successful
party to an arbitration still must be concerned about the enforceability of an
arbitration award against a reluctant loser.
This Article offers criteria for further development of Internet-based
ADR, relating the criteria to elements of procedural due process. It provides
an overview of developments in cyberspace that crystallize ideas for
effective ADR in this new commercial and political space, including the
Virtual Magistrate (VMAG), judicial and administrative agency public
access techniques, the Better Business Bureau online (BBBOnline), World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) dispute resolution for
trademarks/domain name disputes, and consumer techniques such as credit
card chargebacks and eBay's escrow arrangements.
The Article explains why disputes between merchants and consumers
present greater challenges than business-to-business disputes, necessitating
2 SeRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES § 401 (1987) (describing bases for jurisdiction).
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public law frameworks for private dispute resolution systems. It then
concludes by explaining how systems can be constructed that meet these
criteria while being linked to other new techniques for hybrid international
regulation of Internet activities.
IL CRrrmuA
The criteria for Interet-based dispute resolution depend on the type of
dispute resolution contemplated. Criteria appropriate for arbitration are not
necessarily appropriate in every respect for mediation or credit card
chargeback systems. Because arbitration is the most formal and
comprehensive form of dispute resolution resulting in a binding decision,
however, it is useful to begin with criteria for arbitration and then to
consider how those criteria should be relaxed or otherwise modified for
"softer" forms of dispute resolution.
A. Arbitration
Arbitration is a form of adjudication. Basic concepts of adjudicative due
process 3 provide an appropriate starting point for developing online
arbitration criteria. Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly,4 holding that the due process clause of the U.S.
Constitution prohibits termination of social benefits without a hearing
meeting the criteria of procedural fairness, Judge Henry J. Friendly wrote an
article in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review entitled Some Kind of
Hearing.5 In this article, Friendly defined eleven requirements of procedural
due process that can be applied to adjudicative procedures.6 He did not
suggest that all eleven must be present in order for due process to be
satisfied; rather, his list of procedural elements represents a kind of menu.7
3 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution require procedural due process only when the state deprives a person of
"life, liberty, or property." Id. Most of the disputes considered in this Article do not
involve governmental deprivation. Nevertheless, procedural due process provides a
conceptual framework for evaluating the fairness and adequacy of private dispute
resolution.
4 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
5 See generally Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267
(1975).
6 See id. at 1279-91.
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As one moves down the list, more formality and more fairness are present,
albeit at increased cost.
Judge Friendly's first criterion, an unbiased decisionmaker, is the most
rudimentary element of due process. 8 In the online arbitration context, this
means that the decisionmaker for dispute resolution must be someone other
than the person who made the decision leading to the dispute. Widely
accepted arbitration systems, such as those defined by the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) 9 and by the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC),10 maintain rosters of qualified arbitrators who have been
screened to ensure the absence of bias. Online dispute resolution systems
similarly should begin with rosters of qualified and unbiased
decisionmakers, with appropriate background information available online,
to facilitate review and selection of arbitrators by disputants.
Judge Friendly's second element, notice and a statement of reasons for
the initial action giving rise to the dispute,'1 is linked conceptually with his
third element, the opportunity to present reasons why the disputed action
should not be taken. 12  Both these elements represent pleading
requirements. 13 They contemplate that both claimant and respondent set
forth their positions, thus defining the controversy to be resolved. In some
controversies, such as ones involving claims of fraud, the burden of proof,
and therefore the burden of pleading, is placed on the claimant. As Federal
7 Selections from the "menu" depend on a pragmatic balancing of the magnitude of
the deprivation resulting from erroneous decisions, the efficacy of a particular
"ingredient" from the menu in improving accuracy, and the cost to the dispute resolution
system of affording additional procedural elements. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 347-48 (1975).
8 See Friendly, supra note 5, at 1279-80.
9 See American Arbitration Association (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.adr.
org>.
10 See International Chamber of Commerce (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http:/l
www.iccwbo.org>.
II See Friendly, supra note 5, at 1280-81. Judge Friendly wrote in the context of
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1977), in which the dispute was triggered by cutting off
welfare benefits. In the ordinary civil litigation context, it is the plaintiff who seeks a
change in the status quo. In that context, the second element can be understood as a
requirement that the plaintiff give reasons why the law justifies a judgment in the
plaintiff's favor.
12See Friendly, supra note 5, at 1281. In the civil litigation context, the third
element represents the defendant's opportunity to answer the complaint, presenting legal
or factual defenses.
13 To characterize these elements of due process as pleading requirements does not
suggest that writings are necessary; pleading in this sense may be entirely oral.
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Rule of Civil Procedure 9 requires, "fraud must be pleaded with
particularity." 14
After the claimant sets forth the particulars of the alleged fraud, the
respondent should be able to deny the allegations or offer "new matter"-
additional factual allegations that would exonerate the respondent from legal
liability. In other types of controversies, such as a complaint over removal of
material from a web server, the burden of proof and therefore of pleading
most appropriately rests with the respondent. Pleading obligations should be
organized so that someone whose web page is taken down can protest the
action through an online arbitration mechanism, thereby triggering an
obligation on the part of the respondent to explain why the page was taken
down. Then the complainant can challenge the reasons offered by the
respondent.
The first three Friendly elements are essential for any online arbitration
system. They also may be sufficient for simple claims. Indeed, in many
instances, an exchange of formal positions in the virtual presence of an
unbiased decisionmaker will be enough to permit a settlement because these
first three elements permit the parties to understand each others' positions
more concretely than they may have before exchanging their position
statements or pleadings.
In other cases, however, the first three Friendly elements will not be
enough, and the online arbitration process must include other elements from
Judge Friendly's list. The fourth element, an opportunity to present
evidence, including witnesses, in support of one's position, is only
appropriate to help resolve factual disputes.15 In order to make this element
meaningful, some procedural device should be available to define the factual
issues in dispute, lest the fourth element deteriorates into an unfocused
group debate. One possibility is for the arbitrator, after reviewing the
pleadings, to issue a statement defining disputed facts and the law to be
applied to the facts once determined. This procedural device is akin to a
partial summary judgment 16 or a final pretrial order, 17 although in the online
arbitration context it can be much simpler and briefer than a typical partial
summary judgment or pretrial order in federal court practice.
As with the judicial process for developing pretrial orders, parties
wishing to call witnesses should be required to relate the expected witness
14 bED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
15 See Friendly, supra note 5, at 1282-87.
16 See F8D. R. Civ. P. 56.
17 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
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testimony with particular facts in dispute. The arbitrator should have the
power to limit the number of witnesses in the interest of efficiency. How
witnesses should be heard presents a technological challenge. The simplest
technologies, e-mail exchanges and web-based discussion spaces, can be
used when written statements by witnesses are sufficient. They also are
sufficient for textual documentary evidence such as subscriber agreements.
The process is equivalent to that in common law and civil law judicial
procedure for deciding cases based on affidavits and exhibits thereto.
In some but not all cases, witness credibility will be important. When
that is so, some mechanism must be available to allow the arbitrator to
observe witness demeanor and thereby to judge credibility. The simplest but
most expensive possibility is to take these cases "offline" and schedule a live
face-to-face hearing at which witnesses can testify. But this is not the only
possibility. Increasingly, judicial and formal administrative agency
proceedings allow witnesses to testify via video conference or video
recording. 18 As the bandwidth of Internet connectivity improves, it is
feasible to use inexpensive video and audio technology to allow witnesses to
testify over the Internet with their voices and images available to the
disputants and to the decisionmaker. Video cameras, microphones, speakers,
and capture (digitization) cards for desktop and portable computers are
available now for about $150. Online arbitration systems should be designed
to accommodate this kind of evidence when the parties have the necessary
hardware and bandwidth.
Judge Friendly's fifth element, the right to know opposing evidence, 19
and sixth element, right to cross-examine opposing witnesses,20 elaborate on
the notice and witness presentation elements. Both discovery and cross-
examination may be conducted by electronic means, such as e-mail
exchanges with attachments and Internet-based telephone or video
conferencing.
Judge Friendly's seventh element, limiting the decision to that which can
be justified by the record,21 helps to ensure that the hearing process is not a
sham, but it also increases the burden on the parties' counsel to get
everything in the record necessary to support their positions. The existence
of a record is also necessary to permit complete appellate review, in those
cases for which some form of appeal is provided. Imposing a record
18 See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7) (allowing telephonic depositions by agreement of
parties).
19 See Friendly, supra note 5, at 1282-87.
20 See id.
21 See id. at 1287-91.
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requirement for online arbitration may be less onerous than imposing the
same requirement for live dispute resolution. When parties argue their
positions and present witnesses orally in the physical presence of a dispute
resolver, it is cheaper if no verbatim record must be made. In contrast, online
dispute resolution automatically generates a record because textual
submissions and oral submissions transmitted electronically are fixed
(recorded) by the technology. Accordingly, it is appropriate to have a basic
record requirement in online arbitration.
The eighth element, the right to be represented by counsel,22 has few
implications for the technical design of online arbitration systems; instead,
the availability of this right depends on a policy judgment. Allowing counsel
increases the cost of dispute resolution procedures. A party wishing to
minimize costs nevertheless may be unwilling to suffer the disadvantage
associated with being unrepresented while the opponent is represented.
Moreover, use of counsel interposes delay. Parties must be allowed time to
find and retain counsel, and counsel must be allowed time to become
familiar with the case. When disputants act without counsel, they may
proceed directly to define their dispute before the decisionmaker.
But in all but the simplest cases, counsel is invaluable in helping a naive
disputant understand the procedure, the relevant rules for decision, and the
most effective way to present a case. Online arbitration systems should allow
for counsel, perhaps subject to control by the arbitrator, who may determine
in simple cases that no counsel is permitted.
Judge Friendly's ninth and tenth requirements, that the decisionmaker
prepare a record of evidence presented 23 and give reasons supporting the
decision, 24 are appropriate for online arbitration. In very simple
administrative conference-type proceedings, and in some labor arbitrations,
the reasoned decision requirement imposes additional burdens and costs on
the decisionmaker and is unnecessary to the perceived fairness and
legitimacy of the process. A decisionmaker can meet with the parties, hear
their stories, and say, "I have listened carefully and it is my overall judgment
that Party A should win."
But the benefits of reasoned decisionmaking outweigh the costs for
online arbitration. Online arbitration is a new process and therefore likely to
be mistrusted to some extent by early users. Reasoned decisionmaking will
alleviate some of the mistrust. Moreover, if the public has access to online
22 See id. at 1291-92.
23 See id.
24 See id. at 1293-94.
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arbitral decisions, decisions without accompanying reasons are only of
modest utility; those wishing to understand the developing decisional law
must infer the reasons for decisions from the parties' pleadings and from the
testimony. Moreover, appellate review with any degree of deference to the
original decisionmaker is almost impossible without reasoned
decisionmaking.
Another element not explicitly enumerated by Judge Friendly, public
access to the proceedings, 25 implicates conflicting interests. Many disputants
prefer commercial arbitration over judicial conflict resolution precisely
because arbitration proceedings need not be open to the public. Closed
proceedings allow presentation of proprietary material and avoid the risk that
public knowledge of one dispute may trigger the presentation of other
disputes. On the other hand, the democratic tradition mistrusts secret
proceedings, and the legitimacy and acceptability of online arbitration may
be diminished if its proceedings are not opened to public scrutiny at some
point. Moreover, most advocates of online dispute resolution for Internet
governance contemplate the development of a body of decisional law to help
people understand the ground rules for conduct. Only if decisions are
available to the public can this aspiration be realized.
But transparency need not occur at the outset of an online arbitration. As
was the case with the Virtual Magistrate system, parties may present their
positions and evidence to the arbitrator in closed electronic spaces with the
decision in the record being opened up to the public only after a decision is
made in the case.26
Judge Friendly's eleventh element, the availability of appellate review,27
contemplates a range of possibilities. One polar position is to allow no
appellate review at all when the parties have so stipulated. A slightly more
intrusive possibility is represented by the extremely narrow grounds for
judicial review of arbitration awards under the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, in which an
arbitration decision may not be reviewed on the merits, but can be
overturned only for fraud, gross irregularity in procedure, or the absence of
jurisdiction based on the arbitrator's having exceeded the scope of the
25 See id. at 1279-91.
26 See Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Inst. of Tech., VMAG: Online Dispute
Resolution (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.vmag.org>.
27 See Friendly, supra note 5, at 1294-95.
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agreement to arbitrate. 28 The most intrusive possibility, but also the least
controversial in terms of getting online arbitration started, is represented by
the WIPO guidelines, in which an online arbitration decision is without
prejudice to a subsequent decision by a traditional judicial or administrative
agency tribunal.29
Opening up online arbitration to a subsequent de novo decision by
another tribunal does not necessarily vitiate entirely the effect of online
arbitration. The experience of court-annexed arbitration when state
constitutions mandate an opportunity for subsequent de novo jury trial
demonstrates that many disputes stop at the arbitration stage. The parties
perceive the initial decision as representing a reasonably accurate prediction
of what a jury will do, and the substantial additional transaction costs of
proceeding to a jury trial outweigh the expected value of the result. It may be
that the most prudent course for proponents of online arbitration is to allow
de novo trials in other tribunals-at least for a period of time, until online
arbitration has proven its acceptability.
B. Mediation
The transcript of the first online ombuds case30 provides a good example
of online mediation. Analysis of the interaction disclosed by that transcript
offers a concrete context for evaluating mediation under Judge Friendly's
elements of due process. The first element-an unbiased decisionmaker 3 1-
is appropriate and essential for effective mediation, although mediation does
not vest the neutral party with actual decisionmaking power. Neutrality is
essential for the kind of trust that allows mediation to work.
The second and third elements32 also are appropriate for mediation;
indeed, the mediation process is focused on facilitating party communication
about the reasons favoring and opposing proposed action. The difference
between mediation and arbitration is that arbitration structures the second
28 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
art. V, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 40-41 [hereinafter New
York Convention].
29 See WIPO, Guidelines for Online Arbitration Decisions (visited Mar. 27, 2000)
<http:llarbiter.wipo.intdomains/access/index.html>.
30 See Transcript of a Dispute: The Web Site Developer and the Newspaper (visited
Apr. 15, 2000) <http://aaron.sbs.umass.edu/center/ ombuds/narrativel.html>.
31 See Friendly, supra note 5, at 1279-80.
32 See id at 1280-81.
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and third elements while mediation allows a more fluid process. Mediation
seeks a kind of conversation.
For the remaining elements in Judge Friendly's system, 33 arbitration and
mediation diverge completely. Rarely would mediation involve the
presentation of evidence through documents or third-party testimony.
Counsel is less appropriate for mediation because mediation seeks to engage
the parties directly in assessing how their interests can be reconciled. Privacy
rather than public scrutiny helps the parties communicate candidly with the
mediator and with each other. Usually there is no record, and there is no
third-party decision to be bound by a record or to be subjected to appellate
review.
III. EXPERIENCE
The Virtual Magistrate34 is an online arbitration system initially
implemented in the fall of 1996. VMAG resulted from discussions organized
in October 1996 by David R. Johnson, a partner at Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering, former president of Counsel Connect, and former president of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation. 35 Mr. Johnson, Robert M. Gellman, former
chief counsel of the Government Operations Committee in the House of
Representatives, representatives of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), counsel for America Online and CompuServe, as well as this author,
were concerned about the dilemma confronting online service providers such
as America Online when they were accused of allowing access to illegal
material, such as postings or e-mail messages that infringed copyright,
invaded privacy, represented consumer fraud, or were defamatory. In such
circumstances, the service provider could choose to remove the accused
material, potentially exposing the service provider to liability in favor of the
author or sponsor,36 or the provider could allow it to remain, resulting in
potential liability to the accuser. Now, the Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act 37 provides a safe harbor for service providers that
implement detailed procedures for removing material. 38 In 1996, however,
33 See id. at 1281-91.
34 See Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Inst. of Tech., VMAG: Online Dispute
Resolution (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.vmag.org>.
35 See id.
36 See generally, e.g., Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1105
(E.D. Mich. 1998).
37 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV 1998).
3 8 See id.
[Vol. 15:3 2000]
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CYBERSPACE
no such statutory safe harbor existed. The designers of VMAG sought to
provide a mechanism for a quick and inexpensive interlocutory 39 dispute
resolution mechanism to decide whether accused material should be
removed immediately or should be allowed to remain.
While the design of VMAG may not have met all the requirements of the
New York Convention40 or the Federal Arbitration Act,41 and thus VMAG
decisions may not have the same preclusive effect as arbitration awards,
VMAG designers nevertheless thought that the existence of an interlocutory
decision by a third party would show that the service provider acted in good
faith in dealing with accused material and that the decision would be given
some weight by a court ultimately deciding the dispute on the merits, or that,
at the least, it would avoid damages linked to bad faith or indifference.42
From the beginning, VMAG was implemented entirely through the
World Wide Web, with e-mail communication as a backup. No aspect of the
procedure involved paper submissions or reports or face-to-face contact.
Disputes were handled pursuant to procedural rules posted on the VMAG
website.43 A complainant could initiate a VMAG case by clicking on an e-
mail button on the website to post a complaint.44 Complaints thus posted
initially were screened by an AAA staff member who determined whether
the complaint facially was within the jurisdiction of VMAG.45 An
affirmative determination resulted in the AAA staff member selecting a
virtual magistrate from a roster maintained by the AAA.46 One could be
3 9 Interlocutory signifies a preliminary or provisional decision, in the expectation
that more comprehensive litigation on the merits will follow.
4 0 See generally New York Convention, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. at 38.
41 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
42 See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993)
(finding a $10 million punitive damage award not "grossly excessive" given the bad faith
of petitioner); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1153
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding punitive damages were appropriate if defendant acted with
reckless indifference to plaintiffs' rights).
43 See Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Inst. of Tech., The Virtual Magistrate
Project: Basic Rules (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http:lwww.vmag.orgldocs/rules.html>.
44 See Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Inst. of Tech., VMAG: Online Dispute
Resolution (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.vmag.org>.
45 See Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Inst. of Tech., The Virtual Magistrate
Project: Concept Paper (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http:llwww.vmag.orgldocs/concept.
html>.
46 See id.
685
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listed on the roster by qualifying under general AAA rules to be an arbitrator
and also demonstrating familiarity with Internet technology.47
Once a virtual magistrate was selected, the magistrate would forward the
complaint to the respondent and any affected third parties, such as an online
service provider or the originator of the accused material. 48 Respondents
were given several hours to respond through the website. The virtual
magistrate then was obligated to make a decision within seventy-two
hours.49 Until a decision was made, the record of the proceedings was not
open to the public, but a decision triggered an automatic routine that moved
the complaint, the response, the decision, and other pertinent materials to a
part of the website open to the public. 50 In the first two years of VMAG's
existence, only one case was decided.51 Several dozen other complaints were
submitted, however, and a few of these resulted in settlements. Most of the
others were determined to be outside the scope of VMAG jurisdiction.
In late 1996 and early 1997, Peter E. Sand, now with the Pennsylvania
Attorney General's Office, sought to induce participants in Internet
electronic commerce in eastern Pennsylvania to participate in VMAG.
Though interest was expressed, no actual use resulted. VMAG received
extensive print publicity, but no service providers provided actual links on
their own sites to VMAG. In 1999, responsibility for VMAG was transferred
from Villanova University School of Law to Chicago-Kent College of Law
at the Illinois Institute of Technology. 52 AAA interest in the project had
waned in connection with personnel changes at AAA, and Professor Pam
Kentra at Chicago-Kent took over responsibility for the project, revising the
rules to make VMAG available for a wider range of disputes.
The features of VMAG represent a logical use of the Internet and the
Web for alternative dispute resolution involving relatively simple disputes.
The initial rules confine the dispute resolution system to a very narrow set of
cases, resulting in the rejection of a number of complaints in the early years
of the system's operation. Even after the rules were modified to expand the
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Inst. of Tech., The Virtual Magistrate:
Sample Opinion (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.vmag.org/sample.html>
(forthcoming).
52 See Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Inst. of Tech., The Virtual Magistrate
Project: Frequently Asked Questions (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.vmag.
org/docs/FAQ.html>.
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scope of VMAG jurisdiction, however, few complaints were filed and no
additional disputes were decided.
IV. WHY DID VMAG NOT PROVE MORE POPULAR?
Over three years of existence, VMAG has not attracted many disputes.
Understanding why can help designers of ADR for electronic commerce
design more effective systems.
One reason for VMAG's limited popularity is that initial predictions that
online service providers would refer large numbers of cases to ,VMAG
proved to be wrong. America Online in particular, which was a strong
original proponent of developing the VMAG system, found that its own
internal terms-of-service complaint mechanisms resolved most controversies
successfully and that the feared exposure to conflicting liability before
outside fora did not materialize. Keeping complaints within the internal
system gave AOL and other service providers complete control over the
outcome of the complaint process. Referring the complaints to VMAG
would result in loss of control. Also, the failure of significant numbers of
complainants to submit disputes to VMAG is likely due to the fact they did
not know about VMAG-at least they had no easy way to file a complaint
with VMAG, as contrasted with filing complaints with service providers
directly or in other fora.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the VMAG experience, both
applicable to online dispute resolution systems in general. First, proponents
of online ADR must recognize that whoever has superior economic power in
a dispute is unlikely to be eager to surrender that power to a third party
decisionmaker. Nonunion employers have not embraced arbitration of
employment disputes even though arbitration might protect them from
lawsuits in regular judicial fora.53 The fact is, most complaints about online
services are resolved through complaint mechanisms such as AOL's term-of-
service procedure or credit card chargeback mechanisms. One may be
skeptical of the fairness of such mechanisms, either because decisionmakers
have an economic interest in particular outcomes or because the process does
not result in a binding resolution of the dispute. Nevertheless, complainants
stop with these procedures in the vast majority of cases rather than going on
53 See Jonathan R. Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of
Mediation in Resolving Sexual Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 135,
156-57 (1999).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
to file lawsuits or complaints with administrative agencies. Thus, the
purported benefit of online arbitration is modest.
Second, online dispute resolution procedures must be easy to find and
easy to access, preferably by a link directly on the site where the controversy
arises. For example, one wishing to submit a complaint about noncompliance
with voluntarily adopted privacy policies is far less likely to submit that
complaint to an unfamiliar online dispute resolution process that is not
linked directly to the offending site. The complainant must look for and find
the dispute resolution procedure and then cannot have any confidence that
the dispute resolution forum will have jurisdiction over the complaint, in the
sense that any meaningful relief can be obtained. On the other hand, if the
site at which the controversy arises has a link to the dispute resolution site,
and if the site in controversy represents that it will accept and be bound by a
decision of the dispute resolution forum, complainants are more likely to
make use of that dispute resolution machinery.
A. Virtual Mediation
Shortly after VMAG was launched, Ethan Katsh, Professor of Legal
Studies at the University of Massachusetts, launched a virtual mediation
system.54 In conjunction with the University, as a mechanism for resolving
student complaints under University rules, the University of Massachusetts
Center for Information Technology and Dispute Resolution initiated an
"Online Ombuds Office." 55 The Online Ombuds Office was established in
June of 1996 with a grant from the National Center for Automated
Information Research (the "Center") and also was supported in part by a
grant from the Hewlett Foundation.56 The Center works with eBay and
Up4Sale to mediate disputes arising out of auctions on the Internet.57
The best way to get a feel for the process is to view the transcript of the
first dispute, which is available from the website.58 That dispute involved a
claim by a local newspaper that an Internet user was committing copyright
infringement by posting excerpts from his stories on the Internet-
54 See Center for Info. Tech. & Dispute Resolution, University of Mass., Online
Ombuds Office (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://aaron.sbs.umass.edu/center/ombudsl
default.htm>.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See Transcript of a Dispute: The Web Site Developer and the Newspaper (visited
Apr. 15, 2000) <http:llaaron.sbs.umass.edu/center/ombuds/narrativel.html>.
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apparently in e-mail messages rather than on a web page.59 The Internet user
sought the assistance of the Online Ombuds Office, and Director Ethan
Katsh mediated the dispute himself. Although both of the parties were
located in Kansas, Katsh was in Massachusetts and all of the communication
occurred either by e-mail, fax, or phone.60 The dispute was resolved
successfully with little difficulty or acrimony.61
The University of Massachusetts's virtual mediation project was much
more active than VMAG. Some of this is attributable to its association with
an institution that referred large numbers of complaints. Some of it is
attributable to more effective marketing. Some of it may be attributable to
the superiority of mediation to arbitration as an online dispute resolution
process, although this conclusion is hard to justify given the absence of any
real experience with disputants who made it as far as arbitration and
somehow found that procedure unsatisfactory.
B. Credit Card Chargebacks
The most common form of alternative dispute resolution for consumer
disputes is a credit card chargeback.62 Under the Fair Credit Billing Act,63
credit card issuers must investigate 64 cardholder claims of billing errors.65
"Billing errors" are defmed to include "[a] reflection on a statement of goods
or services not accepted by the obligor or his designee or not delivered to the
obligor or his designee in accordance with the agreement made at the time of
a transaction. '66 When cardholders allege such nonacceptance or
nondelivery, the card issuer may not insist on the charge without determining
"that such goods were actually delivered, mailed, or otherwise sent to the
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 Debit card chargebacks are covered by Federal Reserve Regulation E, 12 C.F.R.
pt. 205 (1999), rather than Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(i) (1999). The definition of
"error" in Regulation E omits claims of nondelivery or nonconforming goods or services.
12 C.F.R. § 205.11(a) (1999).
63 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666 et seq. (1994).
64 See id. § 1666(a)(3)(B)(ii).
65 The claim must be in writing. See id. § 1666(a); see also Himelfarb v. American
Express Co., 484 A.2d 1013, 1018-19 (Md. 1984) (noting that oral notice is insufficient).
66 15 U.S.C. § 1666(b)(3) (1994); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(a)(3) (1999). The
term also includes transactions as to which the cardholder requests documentation as to
the validity of the charge. See id. § 226.13(a)(6).
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obligor and provid[ing] the obligor with a statement of such
determination." 67
Under Regulation Z and the Fair Credit Billing Act, chargebacks extend
only to consumers and not to business transactions. 68
Card issuers typically retain only limited authority-defined by the
merchant and cardholder agreements-actually to adjudicate the dispute,
although repeated claims involving the same merchant may jeopardize the
merchant's membership in the credit card network. 69 In most cases, the
cardholder protests the charge, a chargeback results, the merchant
substantiates the charge, informal negotiation directly between merchant and
cardholder may ensue, and the charge is reinstated.
Major credit card networks extend chargeback protection
internationally7" and have adopted special consumer protection chargeback
rules for electronic commerce. 71
67 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(3)(B)(ii). Regulation Z defines the required investigation to
include such a determination:
If a consumer submits a billing error notice alleging either the nondelivery of
property or services under paragraph (a)(3) of this section or that information
appearing on a periodic statement is incorrect because a person honoring the
consumer's credit card has made an incorrect report to the card issuer, the creditor
shall not deny the assertion unless it conducts a reasonable investigation and
determines that the property or services were actually delivered, mailed, or sent as
agreed or that the information was correct.
12 C.F.R. § 226.13(f) n.13.
68 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.3; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(3)(B).
69 See Banking Policy Report Credit Cards: FTC Expects Processors to Insulate
Operations Against Consumer Fraud, BANKING POL'Y REP., Dec. 7, 1992, at 6, 6-7
(describing settlement between the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Citicorp Credit
Services, Inc. requiring credit card processor to monitor chargeback rates and to stop
processing charges from merchants with unusually high rates, as a protection against
consumer fraud); Patrick E. Michela, "You May Have Already Won... ": Telemarketing
Fraud and the Need for a Federal Legislative Solution, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 553, 571 &
n. 116 (1994) (reporting that consumer fraud operations often are denied access to credit
card systems because of high chargeback rates).
70 As stated by Visa officials:
Visa's chargeback rules do not attempt to track all of the possible consumer
protection laws around the world, although some chargeback rights do correspond
with statutory rights granted to consumers in particular countries, such as the rights
granted under Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z to dispute certain credit card
transactions. The chargeback reasons permitted under Visa's rules for international
transactions have been adopted to enable issuers of Visa cards to address the
fundamental consumer concerns of their cardholders, and incidentally to reinforce
the reputation of Visa Cards as the best way to pay.
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Although good empirical data is lacking, it appears that the system
satisfies both consumers and merchants. Almost no reported cases in the
regular courts exist, suggesting that consumers rarely are motivated to go
beyond the chargeback process to more formal forms of dispute resolution.
It is important for designers of online dispute resolution systems to
understand the apparent attractiveness of the chargeback mechanism. On its
face, it would seem to be an incomplete dispute resolution mechanism quite
different from the arbitration model. Several hypotheses can be offered as to
why it works so well. Chargebacks give customers leverage with merchants
against whom they have claims, thus equalizing to some extent otherwise
disparate bargaining power. Psychological satisfaction results from
triggering a chargeback even if the customer eventually has to pay the full
price. In at least some cases, triggering a chargeback gets the merchant's
attention, allowing the merchant and the consumer to work out a
compromise. And, in extreme cases, there is the possibility that the consumer
will not have to pay or that the merchant will be excluded from the credit
card network, ending a pattern of consumer abuse. Moreover, the system is
Letter from Broox W. Peterson, Senior Vice President and Associate General Counsel,
Visa International Service Association, to the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission
(March 25, 1999) (on file with the Federal Trade Commission), available in Federal
Trade Comm'n, U.S. Perspectives on Consumer Protection in the Global Electronic
Commerce Marketplace (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw
comments/visa.htm>.
Likewise, American Express has stated, "[w]hile U.S. law requires us to institute
these practices, as a card issuer, we have adopted a policy of applying them consistently
outside the U.S. as well. If a cardmember outside the U.S. is afforded more protection
under local law, we of course comply with that law." Letter from Sally Cowan, Group
Counsel, American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., to the Secretary of
the Federal Trade Commission (June 30, 1999) (on file with the Federal Trade
Commission), available in Federal Trade Comm'n, U.S. Perspectives on Consumer
Protection in the Global Economic Marketplace (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.ftc.
govlbcp/icpw/comments/american express.htm>.
71 American Express also stated:
We will immediately chargeback a merchant selling goods or services delivered
electronically (e.g., software, images) if a cardmember disputes the charge (for
example, claiming it was unauthorized). There are several sound business and policy
reasons underlying this rule: processing an inquiry is costly and not justified by the
usually small dollar amount of these transactions. In addition, an immediate
chargeback for these types of purchases provides an incentive for the merchant to
exercise greater care in authorizing such transactions.
Letter from Sally Cowan, Group Counsel, American Express Travel Related Service
Company, Inc., to the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 70.
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cheap, easily accessible, and quick. A consumer need not search for and find
a lawyer or a third-party dispute resolution forum. All that is necessary upon
receiving a monthly credit card statement is to call or write the card issuer
and protest the charge. The card issuer and the merchant handle the rest. No
dispute resolution fees are involved.
Merchants like the system compared to other possibilities such as
accepting personal checks for a larger percentage of transactions because the
merchant is in a better position with credit card chargebacks than with stop
payment orders on checks. If a consumer buys merchandise or services with
a personal check and then stops payment on the check to protest failure of
the merchant to perform, the merchant has no attractive remedy. It only can
sue the consumer or cut the consumer off from further check-payment
privileges. Cutting the consumer off may be an effective remedy for the
merchant when there is a continuing relationship between the merchant and
consumer, but not in stranger transactions, which are increasingly important
to electronic commerce. Lawsuits over small consumer transactions are no
more attractive to merchants than to consumers. They are expensive, require
lawyer involvement, and engender long delays.
Credit card chargebacks are a more common form of dispute resolution
in the United States than in other prosperous nations.72 One of the reasons is
the existence of Regulation E in the United States, which requires card
issuers to make chargebacks available. 73 Canadian banks strongly oppose the
institution of chargebacks in Canada because of concern about processing
costs for card issuers.74 This reluctance is reinforced by the perception of
7 2 Chargebacks are required by law in the United Kingdom and not provided for in
France, although the Visa and Mastercard systems provide them throughout Europe to
some extent. See Organization for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Consumer Redress in the
Global Marketplace: Chargebacks (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.oecd.orgfdsti/sti/
it/consumer/prod/e_96-142.htn>. In the United Kingdom, merchants have interpreted
section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act of 1974, 22 & 23 Eliz. 2, ch. 39, § 75 (1974)
(Eng.), which establishes a chargeback regime, as inapplicable to international
transactions. U.K. credit card issuers have agreed to apply section 75's protections in
certain limited categories of international transactions. See id. § 69. The Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD's) Committee on Consumer Policy
has addressed the possibility of establishing an international chargeback regime that
would overcome the domestic limitation of national legal regimes. See Organization for
Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Consumer Redress in the Global Marketplace: Chargebacks
(visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.oecd.orgl/dstilstilit/consumer/prodle_.96-142.htm>.
73 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (1999).
74 See Organization for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Consumer Redress in the
Global Marketplace: Chargebacks (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/
it/ consumer/prod/e_96-142.htm>.
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Canadian card issuers that the incidence of disputes is much higher in
electronic commerce than in conventional face-to-face commerce.75
In Europe, chargebacks are not required, but they are nevertheless fairly
common in credit card and debit card agreements.76 The availability of
chargebacks in debit card agreements is much more important in Europe than
in credit card agreements because the proportion of consumer transactions
accomplished through debit cards relative to credit cards in Europe is much
higher than in the United States, although the total of credit and debit card
transactions is a much smaller proportion of the total universe in Europe than
in the United States.77 The relatively wide availability of chargebacks in
Europe despite the absence of any government compulsion to offer them is
strong testimony to their attractiveness as an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism.
As with newer and relatively untested mechanisms such as eBay's
escrow, insurance, and complaint-posting procedures, credit card
chargebacks put a private sector intermediary in the position of being the
dispute resolver. Intermediaries are willing to do this because the availability
of mutually acceptable dispute resolution facilitates consumer and merchant
use of the intermediaries' services. Intermediary-provided dispute resolution
greatly reduces search costs and other costs because the intermediary already
has a relationship with both disputants. 78
As the preliminary report on the subject by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) said:
Financial intermediaries appear best suited to resolve individual
transaction problems in the global marketplace through chargeback
mechanisms. This involves reversing a transaction (charging it back to the
seller) to settle various types of problems (for example, nondelivery of
goods, nonconformance of goods, billing errors, etc.). Chargeback
mechanisms encourage merchants to provide high levels of customer
satisfaction, as card associations withdraw card privileges from merchants
with excessive chargeback rates. Such mechanisms have long been available
in the United States and are credited with helping to create consumer
confidence in, and widespread use of, catalog shopping in that country.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See id.
7 8 See John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace
Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J 893, 977 (1999) (proposing that credit card systems expand
chargeback rights to facilitate electronic commerce).
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During the several years of discussions on this project with card associates,
the spread of such mechanisms internationally and to debit cards has been
seen as an encouraging sign.79
C. EBay's Escrow and Insurance Arrangements
EBay80 is a Web-based auction service popular with individuals and
small businesses wishing to buy and sell merchandise and services.
Apparently because eBay fears that people will stop using its service because
of threats of fraud and nonperformance of agreements, it offers several
mechanisms for avoiding or resolving disputes. One mechanism is Escrow,
which allows purchasers to escrow their payments until they accept
delivered merchandise. 8' The function of iEscrow is very much like a
documentary letter of credit.82 Both the letter of credit and iEscrow are
intended to protect the interests of both buyer and seller in international
transactions in which there is a risk of nonperformance on one side or the
other. EBay also offers a complaint mechanism and feedback and evaluation
of buyers and sellers. The combination of these services permits an
unsophisticated user to assess, in advance, whether it wishes to deal with
another unsophisticated user based on that user's reputation in the eBay
community. Then, if a complaint arises, the victim can enlist eBay in
attempting to resolve the dispute. Ultimately, eBay commits only to refer
serious complaints to public authorities. This is an obvious example of
traditional law backing up a private dispute resolution mechanism.
The National Consumer's League (NCL) provides a somewhat similar
service,83 although it, unlike eBay, is not involved in facilitating electronic
79 See Organization for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Consumer Redress in the
Global Marketplace: Chargebacks (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/dsti/
sti/it/ consumer/prod/e_96-142.htm>.
80 See eBay (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.ebay.com>.
81 See eBay, Inc., Services: Escrow Overview (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://pages.
ebay.com/help/community/escrow.htm/>.
82 A letter of credit is a written commitment by a bank to make payment of a defined
amount of money (usually from an account set up by a buyer) to a beneficiary (usually
the seller) according to the terms and conditions specified in the contract between the
buyer and seller; typically these include the presentation of certain documents, such as a
bill of lading or an inspection certificate. Examples of documentary letter of credit forms
can be found at AVG Trade Group, Interactive Sales and Letter of Credit Transaction
Forms (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.avgtsg.com/gbmforms.htm>.
83 See Susan Grant, Fraudulent Schemes on the Internet: Remarks to the Senate
Permanent Committee on Investigation (Feb. 10, 1998), in National Consumers League,
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commerce directly. NCL accepts complaints of e-commerce fraud and
forwards them to the Federal Trade Commission and to state attorneys
general. 84 This is another example of a new type of intermediary that helps
mice mobilize the resources of public authorities.
Some of this is not very international yet. The NCL service only
provides for reference to U.S. authority, and there is no suggestion that eBay
will refer complaints to consumer protection authorities in other countries.
On the other hand, there is nothing about iEscrow, the feedback and
evaluation system, or the internal eBay complaint resolution mechanisms
that limits them to national boundaries; they function just the same in
transnational transactions as in local ones. Moreover, it is entirely
conceivable that including arbitration within the scope of the New York
Convention could strengthen the eBay complaint resolution machinery.
Agreements to arbitrate either could be a condition of doing business on
eBay or an option, much as iEscrow is an option.
Fraudulent Schemes on the Internet: Remarks to the Senate Permanent Committee on
Investigation (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.natlconsumersleague.orgnettest.htm>.
The National Fraud Information Center (NFIC) originally was established in 1992 by
the National Consumers League. Consumers can report Internet fraud through the NBC
website, see National Fraud Information Center (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.
fraud.org/welcome.htm>, or by calling the hotline at 1-800-876-7060. Though the
website was launched only two years ago, it has had more than 5 million visitors to date.
Every week, the National Fraud Information Center and Internet fraud watch programs
receive an average of 1,500 calls and an equal number of e-mails, plus dozens of letters.
The NFIC also takes reports from consumers about possible telemarketing or Internet
fraud and relays them to a variety of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in
the United States and Canada. See id.
The NBC data system uploads new reports daily to an electronic database
maintained by the Federal Trade Commission and the National Association of Attorneys
General. See id.
Charts showing types of fraud and their geographic locations for 1997 are available
at National Consumers League, Charts from Senate Testimony by Susan Grant to the
Senate Permanent Committee on Investigations (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.natl
consumersleague.org/charts.htm#comploc>. Comparison charts for 1998, showing types
of fraud, age of victim, and payment methods are available at National Consumers
League, Top Ten Internet Fraud Report Charts (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.
natlconsumersleague.org/Internetscamfactsheet.html>.
84 See Grant, supra note 83.
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D. WIPO Procedures
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)85 developed
recommended uniform processes for resolving disputes over Internet domain
names that conflict with trademarks. 86 The procedures now are in use to
resolve disputes involving domain name registrars, who agree on the need
for uniform dispute resolution procedures covering this set of disputes.87
Article V of the WIPO report on Internet domain name conflicts with
trademarks, providing for "administrative" resolution of complaints, allows
for complaints and responses to be filed electronically and provides, with
respect to hearings, under Article 27:
a. Normally, the determinations on Complaints under these Rules are to
be made with reference to the file alone. However, as an exceptional matter
a Panel may, at the request of a Party or on its own motion, determine in
relation to a particular complaint that a hearing shall be held with the
participation of the Parties.
b. For the purposes of this Article, "hearing" shall include a physical
meeting, a telephone or video conference and the simultaneous exchange of
electronic communications in a manner that allows the Panel and the Parties
to receive any communication sent by one of them and to send
communications to the others. 88
E. BBB Online
The Better Business Bureau (BBB) has developed a privacy program for
businesses, which receive a BBBOnline "seal" if they agree to conform to
the policies. The BBBOnline procedures contain dispute resolution
85 See World Intellectual Property Organization (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http:l
www.wipo.org>.
86 See World Intellectual Property Org., Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain
Name Process, (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://ecommerce.wipo.intldomains/process/eng/
final-report.html>.
87 See World Intellectual Property Org., WIPO Internet Domain Name Process
(visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://ecommerce.wipo.intldomains/process/englwipol.html>
(reporting on the July 27, 1999 WIPO meeting in Washington, D.C.).
88 World Intellectual Property Org., Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain
Name Process (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://ecommerce.wipo.intldomains/process/
eng/finalLreport.html>.
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policies, 89 but, remarkably, the procedures do not authorize electronic
submissions or electronic hearings, referring at one point to teleconferencing
to permit "oral" interaction.9" BBBOnline does not make it possible to file a
complaint through the Web. As of September 26, 1999, the BBBOnline site
had no link for any dispute resolution services, but only about obtaining a
seal to participate as a merchant in the BBBOnline program.
From March 17, 1999 to June 30, 1999, BBBOnline received 225
inquiries and 4 complaints-apparently by telephone, fax, and regular mail.
None of the complaints resulted in decisions. One was settled and the other
three were determined to be ineligible.91
F. Other Online Dispute Resolution Projects and Proposals
As another example, Technology Mediation Services extols the virtues
of mediating high technology intellectual property and Y2K disputes, but
nowhere on its Web page does it offer an opportunity to submit a dispute or
to find out how to submit a dispute.92
V. WHY CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS PRESENT
SPECIAL CHALLENGES FOR ADR
The rapid growth of electronic commerce on the Internet is beginning to
focus attention on consumer protection. According to statistics maintained
by the National Consumers League, reports of consumer fraud on the
Internet grew from fewer than 1,000 in 1996 to nearly 8,000 in 1998. 93
Consumer protection is a broad category, encompassing securities fraud,
deceptive advertising, failure to deliver promised products or services, and
personal data privacy protection. It is useful to deal with privacy separately,
because it already has received so much attention. While ultimately it may
89 See Better Bus. Bureau, BBBOnLine Privacy Program Dispute Resolution
Process: Privacy Policy Review Service and Privacy Review Appeals Board.(visited Apr.
15, 2000) <http:llwww.bbbonline.combusiness/privacy/DR/index.html>.
90 Id.
91 See Better Bus. Bureau, BBBOnline Privacy Program Dispute Resolution
Statistics (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.bbbonline.com/businesses/privacy/
statistics.html>.
92See Technology Mediation Services (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.tech
nologiesmediation.com>.
93 See National Consumers League, Top Ten Internet Fraud Reports Charts (visited
Apr. 15, 2000) <http://www.natlconsumersleague.org/Internetscamfactsheet.html>.
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be desirable to focus separately on distinct aspects of consumer protection,
initially it is useful to seek to identify characteristics that may distinguish the
broad category of consumer protection issues from other Internet legal issues
such as taxation, hate speech, pornography, payment systems, and
intellectual property.
One distinguishing characteristic of consumer protection issues is the
disparity of bargaining power between seller and purchaser. The bargained-
for exchange model of contract is conspicuously absent from the vast
majority of consumer transactions. Instead, sellers unilaterally specify the
terms of the sale, offering them to consumers on a "take it or leave it" basis.
This disparity of bargaining power leads legislatures and administrative
agencies to prescribe special terms for consumer contracts. The terms supply
default legal rules and in some cases are nonwaivable by contract-so-called
"mandatory rules." 94 The power disparities also lead law reform initiatives
such as the United Nations Committee on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) to limit their drafting activities to business-to-business
94 Article V of the European Economic Community Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations provides in material part as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 [providing that "a contract shall be
governed by the law chosen by the parties"], a choice of law made by the parties
shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him
by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his habitual
residence:
-if in that country the conclusion of the contract was .preceded by a specific
invitation addressed to him or by advertising, and he had taken in that country all
the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract, or
-if the other party or his agent received the consumer's order in that country, or
-if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer traveled from that country
to another country and there gave his order, provided that the consumer's journey
was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to buy.
European Communities: Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
June 19, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1492, 1494. Article V.2 of the New York Convention allows
signatories to refuse enforcement of arbitration awards when "(a) the subject matter of
the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration in the law of that country, or (b)
the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of
that country." New York Convention, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S at
42. This language leaves it open to enforcing states to provide by domestic law that
consumer contracts are not arbitrable.
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contracts95 and to special treatment of consumer transactions under the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 96
On the other hand, it is not correct that consumers have no choices in
electronic marketplaces. Presently, the Internet intensifies competition,
offering consumers a wider array of products and services from different
sellers than they would have in geographically defined markets. While
consumers may not be able to bargain with their voices across the
negotiating table, they can bargain with their computers, rejecting offers
from sellers specifying less attractive terms.
But bargaining with a computer is a reality only while consumers are
shopping, not necessarily after they have agreed to purchase, and only when
the information costs of knowing differing terms offered by different sellers
are low. Once a consumer has purchased a continuing service, switching
costs may be high enough to reduce significantly the range of real consumer
choices after the purchase decision is made.
Disparity of bargaining power often has invited governmental
intervention and less reliance on private ordering in consumer transactions,
if only by requiring certain levels of disclosure of the terms of the bargain
offered, much as the UCC requires that disclaimers of certain warranties be
prominently disclosed.
A second characteristic of consumer transactions is relatively low
transaction value. Indeed, the possibility of small transactions is what makes
the Internet such an interesting medium for electronic commerce. Its
inherently lower transaction costs make it economical for buyers and sellers
to purchase and sell units of smaller value than they could do economically
in physical markets with their higher inventory, rental, utility, labor, and
transportation costs.
But low transaction value means that less is at stake when something
goes wrong. Accordingly, consumers victimized by unscrupulous or
incompetent sellers are less likely to devote necessary resources to
investigating and prosecuting -violations of legal rights. This creates an
economic environment in which the costs of consumer abuse are diffuse
while all the benefits are concentrated. Such asymmetry of costs and benefits
is a traditional justification for governmental intervention in the form of
95 "[Ihis law does not override any rule of law intended for the protection of
consumers." UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce Art. 1 (visited Apr. 15,
2000) <http:llwww.uncitral.orglenglishltexts/electcomlml-ec.htm>.
96 Section 2-102 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides, "nor does this Article
impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers,, farmers or other specified
classes of buyers." U.C.C. § 2-102 (1999).
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publicly funded investigation and prosecution resources, for example by
appropriating public funds for a governmental consumer protection agency
or by allowing class action lawsuits and attorney's fee provisions to
encourage private representation of diffuse consumer interests.
A third distinguishing characteristic of consumer protection is the
existence of consumer protection agencies at almost any level of
government. Such existing agencies naturally seek to extend their
jurisdiction into new areas of commerce to preserve their reason for
existence. Most such agencies have considerable autonomy in making rules
and in allocating resources for investigation and prosecution. The result is
heightened potential for conflicting geographic demands on actors in an
inherently global marketplace.
Dispute resolution through arbitration similarly may provide consumers
far less due process-real or perceived-than regular courts because of
relatively less knowledge on the part of consumers about arbitration
procedures and the characteristics of potential arbitrators. This information
deficit has been noted widely in connection with arbitration of individual
employment disputes. 97 The low transaction value makes it less likely that
consumers will avail themselves of private counsel.
But there is still room for private regulation of consumer transactions.
There is every reason to expect that consumer transactions will occur to a
significant degree within the framework of existing credit card payment and
dispute resolution systems. 98
Market forces as well may stimulate creation of fairly complete systems
of private dispute resolution for consumer disputes because of the need for
merchants and intermediaries such as "virtual shopping centers" to reassure
consumers that they safely can use electronic commerce.
A. Politics of Consumer Protection
The strongest political forces will focus on consumer transactions
because it is those transactions that engender broad sympathy for
overreaching and abuse of private power. It is such political forces that
97 See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the
Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77, 95 (1996) (explaining necessary procedural
protections); Russell Evans, Note, Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.: Can
Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts Survive "Fairness" Analysis?, 50
HASTINGs L.J. 635, 644 (1999).
98 See generally David G. Oedel, Private Interbank Discipline, 16 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 327, 363-64 nn.139, 142 (1993) (summarizing credit card clearing processes
and dispute resolution procedures).
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stimulated so many states to set up consumer protection units in their
attorneys general offices in the first place.99
Three political realities will shape the evolution of international and
national consumer protection mechanisms. First, the usual mechanisms of
issue identification and priority setting in domestic politics are likely to
prefer government-based to private self-regulatory mechanisms. The
aphorism that foxes should not guard chicken coops has not lost its power
merely because of the Internet. Second, private enterprises always will prefer
unilateral decisionmaking and other attributes of autonomy to any form of
third-party dispute resolution. That is why nonunion employment dispute
arbitration has been so slow to take root. That is why the Virtual Magistrate
project did not, in the end, produce the expected flood of referrals from
America Online and other private providers. Third, much of the ethos of
Silicon Valley is undergirded by a remarkable ignorance of politics and
government, and ignorance breeds contempt. Some (but not all) of the
demand for the Internet being its own sovereign simply reflects lack of
awareness of what sovereign governments are. These industry attitudes will
discourage development of effective private regimes for protecting mice
when they deal with elephants.
VI. PUBLIC LAW FRAMEWORKS
Political pressure for effective consumer protection in electronic
commerce accompanied by jurisdictional difficulties in relying entirely on
governmental dispute resolution encourages the development of hybrid legal
systems for dispute resolution. Public law, expressed in the form of national
statutes, regulations, or international treaties, 100 provides a framework for
99 FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, Ill, speaking in 1995, identified some of
the problems confronting consumer protection agencies in dealing with Internet fraud and
consumer disputes while also illustrating examples of international governmental
operations in investigating and remedying such problems. See Roscoe B. Starek, III,
Remarks at the Conference on Transborder Consumer Regulation and Enforcement (June
7, 1995), in Arent Fox, Prepared Remarks of Roscoe B. Starek, III, Commissioner, U.S.
Federal Trade Commission, on the Topic of "Consumer Protection in the Age of
Borderless Markets in the Information Revolution" (visited Apr. 15, 2000)
<http://www.arentfox.com/quickguidetbusinesslines/adverttadvertisinglaw/adlawlawsreg
trr/starek.html>.
100 See generally New York Convention, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. at 38.
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private dispute resolution. Historically, the Federal Arbitration Act 101 and
the Uniform Arbitration Act102 have reinforced arbitration agreements that
meet their requirements, and they have provided for enforcement of
arbitration awards in the regular courts. Now, negotiations between the U.S.
government and the European Commission over a "safe harbor" for private
self-regulation are encouraging the provision of private dispute resolution
mechanisms as a prerequisite for deference to self-regulation. 10 3
In the future, such public law frameworks for private dispute resolution
provide the best means for expressing best practice, and they also provide
incentives for private participants in e-commerce to provide effective
alternative dispute resolution. 104
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
"Build it and they will come" is an aphorism clearly unwarranted for
online dispute resolution. There is no empirical support for the proposition
that persons or institutions involved in cyberspace disputes or other disputes
readily embrace unfamiliar forms of dispute resolution. Rather, the growing
use of alternative dispute resolution almost always is associated with explicit
linkage of ADR to or by one of the disputing parties, as through arbitration
or mediation provisions in terms-of-service or sales contracts, or by the
annexation of ADR procedures to well-known court systems, as in the case
of court-annexed arbitration or family court mediation and conciliation
procedures. 105
There is little basis at this time to conclude that technological limitations
impede use of online ADR. Even simple disputes not requiring oral
101 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
10 2 See generally UNIFORM ARBITRATION AcT (1955).
103 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce Opinion on 2/99
on the Adequacy of the "International Safe Harbor Principles" (visited Apr. 15, 2000)
<http:/europa.eu.int/comn/dgl5/enlmedia/dataprotlwpdocs/wpl9en.htm>.
104 For a more complete analysis of international hybrid regulatory structures, see
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet Is Changing Public International Law, 88 Ky. L.J.
(forthcoming 2000).
105 See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A
Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2169,
2172-74 (1993); Sharon A. Jennings, Court-Annexed Arbitration and Settlement
Pressure: A Push Towards Efficient Dispute Resolution or "Second Class" Justice?, 6
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 313, 314-16 (1991); Paul Nejelski & Andrew S. Zeldin,
Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L.
REV. 787, 796-800 (1983).
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testimony, extensive fact investigation, or discovery have not been submitted
to online ADR systems. Before investing greater amounts of money in
developing more elaborate technological applications for online dispute
resolution, the dispute resolution community should work harder on referral
and linking approaches to develop a greater body of experience with simple
applications. Once this body of experience exists, it will be possible to make
more intelligent judgments about needed technological enhancements.
At the same time, greater use of electronic filing and virtual hearing
processes by the regular courts can add useful insights as to what works well
and what does not work, what is readily acceptable to disputants and their
counsel, and what is not.
Online ADR provides an attractive solution to an important part of the
jurisdictional challenges presented by the Internet's global and "low-barriers
to entry" characteristics.
More empirical research is desirable on credit card chargebacks and
other intermediary-provided dispute resolution to test some of the
hypotheses offered in this Article.
Entrepreneurs offering new kinds of intermediation in electronic
commerce should be alert to the potential attractiveness of escrow,
chargebacks, and insurance mechanisms as ways of building their
businesses.

